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This study examines labour supply responses to spousal sickness absence (SSA) using 
a Swedish longitudinal panel data, from 1996-2002. The overall results present an 
evidence of a decrease in labour supply in response to spousal sickness absence. The 
effect on labour supply increases with spousal earnings level. Women react stronger 
than men, and more often respond to current shorter term SSA, whereas men mostly 





Studien undersöker individers arbetsutbudsreaktioner till partners sjukskrivning, 
baserad på LINDA, en svensk individbaserad longitudinell panel data from 1996-2002. 
Resultaten visar på en minskning i arbetsutbud till följd av partners sjukskrivning. 
Effekten på arbetsutbud ökar med partners inkomstnivån. Kvinnor reagerar starkare än 
men, och reagerar oftare till korttids sjukskrivningar, medan män reagerar mest till 
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Does an individual adjust his or her labour supply in response to spousal ill 
health? If so, how? In this paper we focus on the case where spousal health 
deterioration has affected the working capacity and has subsequently resulted 
in sickness-absence. The expected direction of the labour supply response of 
the healthy spouse to spousal sickness absence (SSA) is however ambiguous. 
On the one hand, potential household income is reduced as the earnings of the 
sick spouse decreases given that the sick spouse can devote less time to market 
activity. The Added Worker Effect literature, which has been developed in the 
context of unemployment, claims that individuals compensate spousal income 
loss by increasing their own labour supply. In the context of sickness absence 
however, it is not obvious that the presumed income loss is the sole driving 
factor in how the healthy spouse would react. The sick spouse may require 
nursing care, and a larger share of the household workload may need to be 
undertaken by the healthy spouse, than would otherwise be the case in the 
context of an unemployed and/or a healthy spouse. This may raise the value of 
the healthy spouse’s home-time and consequently causes the healthy spouse to 
spend less time in market activity, possibly offsetting any positive Added 
Worker Effect.  
 
The literature on ill health has typically focused on labour supply and earnings 
losses suffered personally by the affected. Yet knowledge of these spousal 
effects is crucial for constructing sound health care and disability policy since 
the entire family unit to which a disabled person belongs is affected by the 
losses from imperfect health. Only a handful of papers have looked at the 
implications of ill health on the spousal labour supply decision. The majority of 
these studies have focused on the labour supply of women whose husbands’ 
health worsens. The effects have been found to be very small or insignificant 
indicating that spouse’s labour supply is little affected by the partner’s ill 
health. One of the few studies studying both men and women is that of Charles 
(1999) who, based on US data, finds significant reactions to spousal bad health. 
He finds that husbands and wives respond differently to a spouse’s illness: men 
reduce labour supply substantially in response to wife’s poor health whereas 
wives increase theirs. Coile (2004a), also based on US data, finds evidence of a 
small Added Worker Effect for men, but finds no such effect for women.  
 
This paper fills a gap in the Swedish literature, where this aspect of sickness 
absence has not been addressed. Given that the institutional context is a 
potentially important factor, Sweden presents an interesting case with generous 
sickness absence compensation schemes, which could prove to affect the 
response behaviour to SSA differently compared to other countries with a 
limited SA compensation scheme. Moreover, given the increased share of 
individuals on the labour market who are on longer term sick leave absence the 
past decade, any externalities of long term sickness absence in terms of spousal 
labour supply response could potentially be large. Furthermore, the fact that 
Sweden has among the highest female participation rates in the world, and that 
the typical Swedish household is a dual earner household, makes it equally 
interesting to study both men’s and women’s response behaviour to SSA, instead of solely focusing on women’s response behaviour, which has been 
common in the literature. 
 
The paper is based on LINDA, a longitudinal register based individual data set, 
which covers approximately 3 percent of the Swedish population, 
complemented with information on sickness absence retrieved from the 
National Security Board registers. We study the period 1996-2002 and rely on 
two alternative measures of labour supply to get a broader picture of labour 
supply response to spousal sickness absence: yearly earnings and contracted 
hours measured as the share of full time employment. 
 
Our main result is that if individuals respond to SSA, they do so by decreasing 
their labour supply. We also find evidence that the response to SSA increases 
with the sick spouse’s earnings level. There is, however, a difference across 
gender in several respects. Firstly, women’s response to SSA is stronger than 
that of men. Secondly, women more often respond to current year’s SSA 
whereas men more often show a lag in the response to SSA. Thirdly, women 
react to shorter term SSA as well, whereas men mostly react to longer term 
SSA. We find that the share of household earnings, the education level as well 
as the sector of employment help explain part of the difference in labour supply 
response across gender. 
  
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. Section 2 discusses 
theoretical considerations; section 3 presents a brief overview of the literature. 
Section 4 presents the data and descriptive statistics. The empirical framework 
is presented in section 5, followed by the results. The overall results are first 
discussed followed by an attempt to explain the different labour supply 
responses across gender. The final section provides a concluding discussion.  
2 Theoretical motivation 
 
A couple’s labour supply decision is usually analyzed in terms of the standard 
unitary model or in terms of a cooperative model. In the unitary model the 
household is seen as maximizing one household utility function whose 
arguments are male and female labour supply and consumption. Applying 
demand analysis one can derive the implications of e.g. changes in wages and 
benefits on behaviour. However in this model intra household distribution has 
little meaning. To account for individual behaviour within households, richer 
models of behaviour i.e. bargaining or cooperative models have been 
developed. See e.g. Hallberg (2000) and references therein for details and 
discussion of the differences and similarities of these models.  
 
The theory of spousal labour supply as insurance against negative shocks has 
been developed in the context of unemployment in Ashenfelter (1980), 
Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and Lundberg (1985) and further summarized 
in Gruber and Cullen (2000). In the case of spousal unemployment there is 
expected to be an Added Worker Effect (AWE) because the reduction in 
transitory income following unemployment of the spouse, would raise the 
labour supply of the unaffected spouse as a means of providing within-family 
insurance. 
 
In the case of spousal sickness absence however, other mechanisms are at work 
making the theoretical predictions more ambiguous. Labour supply (LS) can in this case be seen as a function of the usual variables pertaining to the individual 
and spousal sickness absence (SSA), which affects labour supply through three 
main channels: income loss, home production and joint leisure,   
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SSA X f LS
 
 
2.1 Income loss 
 
Given that individuals on sickness absence receive only part of their income in 
sickness compensation, in line with the AWE theory, the healthy spouse should 
raise his/her labour supply to protect the family against this income loss.  
 
One would expect the magnitude of AWE to be stronger the larger is the 
income loss suffered by the household. The extent of the income loss depends 
on the earnings level of the sick spouse as well as whether the compensation 
received by the sick spouse is bounded by income insurance ceiling.
2 
Furthermore, irrespective of the spouse’s earnings level, the sick spouse’s 
initial relative contribution to household earnings could potentially affect the 
healthy spouse’s labour supply response as well. If the sick spouse was the 
main income earner in the household prior to the sick spell the response of the 
healthy spouse could be expected to be higher compared to if the sick spouse 
was not the main income earner.  
 
Several factors may however crowd out the expected increase in the spouse’s 
labour supply. On the one hand, the existence of generous sickness absence 
compensation schemes limits the income loss incurred. On the other hand, 
there are monetary gains of not working, such as cutting back on commuting 
costs as well as lunch costs, which may constitute a relatively large share of 
earnings, especially for low income earners. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of a life cycle model, as pointed out by Heckman 
and MaCurdy (1980) in the case of unemployment, the AWE should be small, 
unless the income loss perceived is large relative to lifetime earnings. 
Individuals whose spouses face a larger risk of being out of work should 
increase their labour supply at all times. The same reasoning would naturally 
apply for ill health. However, even in the context of a life cycle model, 
liquidity constrained families may not have the resources to smooth 
consumption, forcing the healthy spouse to work throughout a transitory sick-
leave spell. 
 
2.2 Home production  
 
When either one of the spouses is spending more time at home, irrespective of 
the reason for not supplying labour on the labour market, he/she can spend 
more time on household work. To the extent that there is substitution in home 
production, increased non-market time for the spouse would lower the 
                                                 
2  See Data section for a review of the Swedish sickness absence compensation scheme. opportunity cost of market-work for the studied individual, further enhancing 
the AWE. The issue of whether there is substitution or complementarities in 
household work remains however an unresolved issue in the literature. 
Nevertheless, it is likely, that when the increase in non-market time is due to 
sickness absence rather than e.g. unemployment, the underlying negative health 
shock would, if anything, strengthen any occurrence of complementarities. 
This is especially the case if the affected spouse requires extra nursing 
assistance.  
 
2.3 Joint leisure 
 
Synchronous leisure is also a factor which may crowd out any AWE. There is 
increasing evidence in the empirical literature that spouses tend to synchronize 
their non-market time.
3 Furthermore, health shocks may change how couples 
value the time they spend together. Not only may the affected spouse need 
more assistance, but the sickness may give new information on lifetime 
prospects that could imply that the affected spouse may have a shortened 
expected lifespan.  
 
Even though we have disentangled the main mechanisms behind labour supply 
responses to SSA affects it is not possible to know theoretically which of these 
opposite effects dominates. The effects can only be assessed empirically.  
3 Previous literature 
 
The main conclusion from the empirical literature, mostly based on US data, is 
that there is little labour supply response to spousal ill health. Cross section 
studies by Parsons (1977) and Berger (1983) find that wives of husbands in 
poor health work more hours than wives whose husbands are healthy. Berger 
and Fleisher (1984) look at the labour supply of wives using longitudinal data 
and find evidence of very small increases in labour supply among wives whose 
husband’s health worsens and no effect on participation for the same women. 
Haurin (1989) finds no statistically significant effect on labour supply for 
women whose husbands’ health worsens. Coile (2004a) and Charles (1999) are 
some of the few studies focusing on both men and women. They both study 
couples who are near retirement based on US data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). In contrast to most of the studies Charles (1999) 
finds evidence of a significant reaction to spousal bad health. He finds that men 
reduce their labour supply by substantial amounts in response to their partner’s 
poor health whereas wives of ill husbands significantly increase theirs. He 
explains the results saying that differences in labour force participation rates 
across genders indicate that there is a significant level of specialisation in the 
family: husbands are the principal bread winners and women the principal 
home and care-takers. When poor health strikes the spouse, women work more 
hours and husbands cut back on work to help around the home. Coile (2004a) 
finds evidence of a small Added Worker Effect for men and a decrease in 
labour supply for women in response to spousal ill health. The decrease in 
labour supply among women is stronger in the presence of disability insurance 
                                                 
3 Most studies have found complementarity of leisure to be an important determinant of early 
retirement decision. See Coile (2004b). benefit for the ill spouse, suggesting that the disability insurance benefit 
crowds out potential spousal labour supply increase – at least among women. 
 
Two related studies based on the same data set used in this paper shed light on 
intra-household adjustments to sickness absence and unemployment. 
Arslanogullari (2000) investigates the labour supply response to spousal 
unemployment, the so called added worker effect. He finds no clear effect for 
men, but finds that Swedish women, increase their earnings in response to their 
spouses’ unemployment. Even though the effect is small in magnitude it is 
found to be linked to the level of unemployment benefits the husband receives. 
Hesselius (2004) finds that spousal retirement has a positive impact on the 
sickness absence rate. He finds women to be more affected than men, and finds 
disability retirement to have a stronger effect compared to old-age retirement. 
 
Sweden offers an interesting context with its generous sickness absence 
compensation schemes, which could prove to affect the response behaviour to 
SSA differently compared to other countries with a limited compensation 
scheme. Furthermore, as Sweden has the highest female participation rates in 
the world, and as the typical Swedish household is a dual earner household, 
makes it equally interesting to study both men and women’s response 
behaviour to SSA and might shed some light on the different response 
behaviour across gender found in the literature.  
4 Data 
 
We use a subset of LINDA, which is a register based longitudinal individual 
data set drawn from income registers and population censuses. 
4 The database 
consists of a large panel of individuals, about 300,000 individuals annually, or 
approximately 3.35 percent of the Swedish population, representative of the 
overall population from 1960 to 2000. The LINDA panel database contains 
corresponding information on the individual’s household members as well.  
 
We restrict our study to the period 1996-2002, corresponding to the period for 
which sickness-absence information is available. The individuals in our study 
are either married or have children and are cohabiting during the period 
studied. We restrict the study to those who have been cohabiting with the same 
partner throughout the period studied.  
 
Further we limit the sample to households where both spouses are between the 
ages of 30 and 58, thus setting the maximum age difference between couples to 
23 years. The lower age limit is also an attempt to exclude individuals in the 
beginning of their working life, where labour supply can fluctuate, and a way 
of restricting the sample to spouses who have been cohabiting or married a 
longer period. The upper age limit is chosen so as to omit individuals who are 
on age related retirement schemes and whose labour supply decision can be 
affected by retirement considerations.  
 
A number of households have been omitted from the sample either based on 
characteristics of the LINDA individual or the spouse. Since labour income is 
                                                 
4 Information from income register, tax return data, unemployment spell data, education level 
data, sick-absence spell from the National Security Board register etc are included in the 
database. For a detailed description of LINDA see Edin and Fredriksson (2000). not an adequate measurement of hours worked for self-employed and given 
that the data on sickness absence does not adequately cover self-employed we 
choose to omit from the study households in which any of the spouses are self-
employed. As compensated sick leave in Sweden can only be claimed by 
individuals holding a job or receiving unemployment benefits, we restrict our 
sample to individuals whose spouses are in the labour market. We thus omit the 
individuals whose spouses do not have a labour income or who receive student 
grants. We however include the individuals whose spouses are on disability 
pension, since a majority of individuals on long-term sickness absence transfer 
into disability pension schemes.  
 
Given that we are interested in the labour supply outcome, we restrict our 
analysis to individuals who are in the labour market and thus omit individuals 
who are retired, are on disability pension or receive student grants.  
 
Based on both the individual and the spouse, we limit our analysis to 
individuals and their spouses who have a minimum yearly earnings of 30 000 
SEK, in order to avoid unnecessary noise, and limit the analysis to individuals 
who are attached to the labour market. 
5   
 
Our sample results in a total of 33 891 women and 34 193 men, about whom 
we have information on their spouses. We thus end up with a total of 68 084 
households which we can follow an average of 4,5 years. 
 
Since we lack data on work hours and wages for the whole sample, we assume 
that work hours can be approximated fairly well by labour income. Wages are 
assumed to be fixed, and the variation in earnings is thus assumed to come 
from variation in hours worked. Fixed effect specifications with age and year 
dummies would pick up any aggregate yearly income increase. Our measure of 
yearly labour earnings does not include any social insurance such as 
unemployment benefit or sickness absence compensation. 
 
Table 1: Sickness absence compensation levels in Sweden 1996-2002, as 
percentage of the normal wage. 
  Jan 1996 – 
Dec 1996 
 
Jan 1997 – 
Dec 1997 
 






























1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2-3  75 0 75 0 80 0 80 0 
4-14  75 0 75 0 80 0 80 0 
15-28  (10)  80  75 0 80 0        (10)  80 
29-90  (10)  80     (10)  80     (10)  80     (10)  80 
91-
365 
0 75 0 75       
(10)* 
80     
(10)* 
80 
366- 0 75 0 75 0 80 0 80 
         
Note: Sick pay is the sickness absence compensation paid by the employer , whereas sickness 
benefit refers to government provided sick-leave insurance. Numbers in parentheses denote 
employer provided additional sickness absence compensation due to collective agreements. 
                                                 
5 Including individuals where the spouse and (or) the LINDA individual has an income of less 
than 30 000 SEK decreases R-sq, but has shown to have little effect on the coefficients of 
interest. The results are robust to setting the minimum yearly earnings to 100 000 SEK.  Throughout this period, sick leave of 8 days or longer require a physician’s certificate. There is a 
ceiling in the sickness absence compensation where the coverage in the public system has been 
capped for approx. 10 percent of the wage-earners. * denotes that based on collective 
agreements, an additional 10 percent of sickness absence compensation can be paid by the 
employer for blue-collar workers in private sector and local government employees.  
Source: Hesselius (2004)   
 
For a sub-sample of the population, we have individual information on 
contracted hours, measured in percentages of full time employment. 
6 For those 
already working full time, this variable does not capture any additional increase 
in hours worked. Contracted hours do not capture temporary increases or 
decreases in work-time. Despite the drawbacks of this variable, it is interesting 
to see if the SSA effects based on yearly earnings can be found even in 
contracted hours. The information on sickness absence is retrieved from The 
National Security Board registers. However, the data only includes sick spells 
covered by the sickness insurance, i.e. sick spells longer than or exempted from 
the sick-pay period covered by the employer.
7 
There have been two main changes in the sick leave compensation scheme 
from 1996-2002. An overview is presented in Table 1. During this period the 
first 14 days of sickness insurance is covered by the employer, except for the 
period January 1997 to April 1998, where the sick pay period covered by the 
employer was extended to 28 days.
8 For reasons of consistency across the 
period we focus in this study on sickness absence exceeding 28 days. In 
January 1998 the compensation level of income loss during sickness absence 
increased from 75 to 80 percent of the normal wage up to a given ceiling, 
corresponding to 7,5 Swedish base amounts. Approximately 10 percent of 
women and 20 percent of men in Sweden have a wage exceeding this amount. 
 
Much of the literature assessing labour supply response to spousal ill health is 
based on self assessed health measures, and is often limited to a particular 
aspect of health being studied. Even though such measures have their 
advantages respondents may make errors when reporting their health, or may 
report poor health for various reasons, such as to justify non-work. By 
restricting our study to sickness absence spells exceeding 28 days we avoid 
some of the measurement problems usually encountered in the literature, as 
sickness absence exceeding a minimum number of days (typically 8 days) 
requires a medical certificate 
 
Given that our information on earnings is that of yearly earnings, our 
measurement on sickness absence refers to the total sum of sickness absence 
days per year for each individual, excluding the first 14 or 28 days of each 
sickness absence spell which is covered by the employer. Even though sickness 
absence periods could typically overlap the year boundaries, aggregating yearly 
sickness absence days helps us differentiate between the current and previous 
                                                 
6 The information on contracted hours does not cover the entire population. Data availability is 
restricted to the entire public sector, and a sample of the private sector covering approximately 
50 percent of the private sector employees. Large firms have a higher probability of being 
sampled, whereas only 3 percent of firms of less than 10 employees are sampled. See Gustavsson 
(2004) for an overview of the sampling process. The information is based on a month of 
measurement typically April, May, September or November. Contracted hours show less 
variation over time than earnings. 
7 The annual number of sickness absence days is provided in terms of full time, ¾ time, half time 
and ¼ time sickness absence, where a part time sickness absent worker is assumed to attend 
work during the remaining time. We aggregate sickness absence days in terms of full time 
absence.  
8 There are however a number of exceptions. If the sick spell is for example due to a recurrent 
disease, it can be compensated by the sickness insurance from day one.  year’s sickness absence spells. Including a dummy for whether the sickness 
spell is overlapping the year boundary has shown to be insignificant and does 
not affect the results. 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics. 
 Men  Women 
 
 
Mean Std.  Dev. 
within 
(between) 
Mean Std.  Dev. 
within 
(between) 
Labour  force  variables        
    Log yearly earnings   12.467  .211  12.015  .227 
           Yearly earnings  289305.6   58154.57 
 
187273.9 39473.38 




       Contracted hours, 





Spousal sickness absence (SSA)         
            1-3 months  .058    .031   
            3-6 months  .019    .01   
            6-12 months  .012    .007   
Spousal disability pension  (SDP)  .163   .152  
Spousal  unemployment  (SU)      
            1-3 months  .029    .022   
            3-6 months  .012    .009   
            6-12 months  .006    .006   
      
Demographics      
    # of children aged under 18  1.25    1.27   
    # of children aged under 6  .3    .31   
    Age  45.35    43.05   
    Migration  .020   .021  
      
Employer      
     Municipal   .176    .463   
     Government  .149    .106   
     Privat  .675    .430   
Education      
Level  1  .191   .121  
Level  2  .469   .493  
Level  3  .350   .386  
Number of observations  156154  153284 
Number of households  34193  33891 
Note: Income variables are set in 1999 year price level. The number of observations and 
individuals with observation on contracted hours is smaller, amounting to a total of 114374 
observations for 29805 women and a total of 96286 observations for 28193 men. The means of 
SSA, SDP and SU refer to the share, in percentage, of individuals whose spouses are on SSA, 
SDP or SU. SSA is limited to sickness absence of more than 28 days. Migration is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if the individuals has changed municipality of residence 
between two time periods. About 2 percent of our sample has changed municipality of residence. 
Education level 1 -3 refers to less than high school, high school and post high school education 
respectively. The means of these dummy variables refer to the percentage share of individuals in 
the respective groups.   
5 Empirical specification 
 
Our basic regression framework for analysing the effect of spousal sickness 
absence is: 
 




s it it SSA SSA X LS ε γ α β β β β + + + + + + = −






2 1 0  (1) 
 
it LS is a measure of an individual’s labour supply behaviour at time t;  it X  is a 
vector of time varying determinants of the labour supply;  sit SSA  is a dummy 
variable for spousal sickness absence at time t and s denotes different lengths 
of sickness absence corresponding to less than 3 months, 3-6 months and 6-12 
months of length, which we refer to as short middle and longer term sickness 
absence spells. The reference group is that of no sickness absence or sickness 
absence of less than 28 days. We choose to have a dummy variable referring to 
periods of various length of spousal sickness absence instead of a continuous 
variable so as not to impose a linear relationship. We thus allow the effect of 
spousal sickness absence to vary freely across various lengths of spousal 
sickness absence. The individual fixed effect  i α  can also be viewed as a 
household fixed effect,  t γ is a year dummy and  it ε  is an error term. We find it 
relevant to control for time-invariant individual and household specific 
characteristics when estimating individual labour supply response behaviour to 
spousal sickness absence. The fixed effects specification enables us to control 
for the household’s overall health status, overall preference in leisure and 
labour supply including permanent patterns in labour supply due to assortative 
mating.  
 
The time varying variables included in the X vector are age, a dummy for 
migration, and the number of children under the age of 6 and 18 living in the 
household. Due to the fixed effect specification and the relatively short time 
period studied, any hump-shaped effect on earnings is not expected, so age 
squared is not included in the specification. The migration dummy is included 
so as to control for changes in earnings resulting from moving. A better job 
offer elsewhere for the prime earner in the household might induce the whole 
family to move. This would affect the prime earner as well as the spouse who 
might have to leave his or her job. This dummy variable is set equal to one in 
year t if the family has moved between t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. Spousal 
unemployment is included both as a control and as a means of having a 
comparison for the effect of SSA. As in the case of SSA, spousal 
unemployment is entered as dummy variables corresponding to less than 3 
months, 3-6 months and 6-12 months of length.   
  
5.1 The issue of exogeneity of sickness absence  
 
Sickness absence and especially sickness absence spells exceeding a minimum 
of 8 days can be regarded as exogenous to the extent that sickness absence is 
the result of ill health and requires a medical certificate. Given that sickness 
absence is exogenous it is natural to include both own sickness absence and 
spousal sickness absence in our set of control variables. 
 
Recent literature has however pointed out a number of factors, besides ill 
health, which affect the decision of calling in sick or being on sickness 
absence. The sickness absence compensation level, in turn depending on ones 
earnings level, the sector of employment, the size of the working place etc have 
been shown to play a role in the decision to call in sick. This puts in question 
the exogeneity of own sickness absence with regard to earnings. Including 
spousal sickness absence is not problematic in this respect as the spouse’s 
sickness absence can be viewed to be exogenous with respect to the earnings of 
the LINDA individual.  
 
Moreover, sickness absence can also be regarded as a means of adjusting ones 
labour supply, for example in response to spousal sickness absence. For a given 
level of ill health, individuals may be more inclined to seek sickness absence if 
the spouse is on sickness absence and requires more assistance at home. In this 
sense both the individuals and the spouses sickness absence can be seen as a 
response to one another’s sickness absence.  
 
The evidence in our sample also points in that direction, where the likelihood 
of being on sickness absence is higher for individuals whose spouses are on 
sickness absence. This could of course be due to assortative mating, or that 
couples are affected by each others physical or psychological illness.  
 
To handle – or at least limit - the extent of “endogenity” in sickness absence we 
use the information on the starting and ending dates of each sick spell for both 
spouses. We limit the sample to the households where the sickness absence of 
the spouse can be considered exogenous or at least predetermined compared to 
that of the LINDA individual. We thus focus on the LINDA individuals who 
are not on sickness absence and on those who are on sickness absence 
simultaneously with their spouse, but whose sickness absence spell started after 
that of the spouse.
9 Spousal sickness absence is thus not a reaction of the 
sickness absence of the LINDA individual as it is predetermined compared to 
that of the LINDA individual. By not controlling for own sickness absence in 
our specification, own sickness absence is seen as a means of adjusting ones 
labour supply.  
                                                 
9 By excluding the observations where the LINDA individual’s sickness absence starts prior to 
that of the spouse’s sickness absence spell, our sample size decreases by a total of 7259 
observations and 499 individuals for the men , and 13002 observations and 999 individuals for 
women. The overall results point in the same direction but are stronger and more significant 
when including these observations.  6 Results 
 
6.1 Initial results – the population as a whole 
 
Table 3 presents fixed effect estimations of equation (1) for men and women 
respectively. The dependent variable is the log of annual earnings. Random 
effects specifications are typically rejected by the Hausman test, in favour of 
fixed effects. The coefficients relating to spousal sickness absence are larger in 
magnitude in the random effects specification compared to the fixed effects 
specification, suggesting that time invariant household specific effects captured 
by the fixed effects are important to control for. 
 
For reason of clarity of exposition, the coefficients of the control variables are 
suppressed in Table 3. 
10 The control variables generally have the expected 
signs, and are for the most part significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
Earnings increase with age. Both men’s and women’s labour supply is affected 
negatively if they have children aged under 6. Female labour supply decreases 
with the number of children under the age of 18 living in the household, 
whereas men’s labour supply increase or remain unaffected. Although not 
always significant, the migration dummy is for the most part positive, 
suggesting higher earnings the year after migration. The coefficients of the 
control variables as well as their significance level are unaffected even if we 




























                                                 
10 The full estimation of equation (1) is presented in Appendix A Table 3: Fixed effects estimation. Dependent variable: log earnings 
 W omenM en
Spousal sickness absence    
           In period t    
< 3 months  -0.008 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.003) 
3-6 months  -0.024** -0.001 
  (0.009) (0.005) 
6-12 months  -0.035** -0.017* 
  (0.011) (0.007) 
          In period t-1    
< 3 months  0.004 -0.017** 
  (0.010) (0.005) 
3-6 months  -0.022 -0.017* 
  (0.014) (0.008) 
6-12 months  -0.021 -0.018* 
  (0.015) (0.008) 
Spousal disability pension 
In period t  -0.032* -0.014+ 
  (0.015) (0.008) 
  In period t-1  -0.007 -0.007 
  (0.019) (0.009) 
Spousal unemployment    
           In period t    
< 3 months  -0.010 -0.000 
  (0.007) (0.005) 
3-6 months  0.004 -0.007 
  (0.011) (0.008) 
6-12 months  -0.017 -0.011 
  (0.015) (0.011) 
          In period t-1    
< 3 months  -0.005 -0.010* 
  (0.007) (0.004) 
3-6 months  0.000 -0.021** 
  (0.010) (0.006) 
6-12 months  -0.014 0.007 
  (0.012) (0.008) 
Observations  111312 118454 
# households  29125 29881 
R-squared  0.14 0.08 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. Control variables are suppressed. 
 
Irrespective of gender, the current year’s SSA has a negative effect on the 
healthy spouse’s labour supply. Compared to individuals whose spouses are 
not on sick leave, men affected by SSA decrease their labour supply by 1.7 
percent in response to SSA of more than 6 months. Women decrease their 
labour supply by 3.5 percent in reaction to SSA exceeding 6 months, and by 
around 2.4 percent in reaction to SSA of 3-6 months. Women whose spouse is 
on disability pension decrease their labour supply by 3.2 percent, whereas the 
corresponding effect for men is 1.4 percent but the latter is significant only at 
the 10% level.  
 
Even though our analysis is based on yearly earnings and yearly sickness 
absence information, there is reason to believe that it may take time to increase 
or decrease labour supply due to a certain rigidity on the labour market, or 
simply due to the fact that it may take time until the individual makes the 
decision to alter his or her labour supply. When controlling for spousal 
variables of the previous year the effects on current SSA remain stable. Men 
decrease their labour supply by approximately 1.7 percent in response to the previous year’s SSA, irrespective of the length of SSA, whereas women remain 
unaffected by the previous year’s SSA.  
 
As mentioned earlier, spousal unemployment (SU) is entered in the regression 
as a control and as a means of comparing the magnitude of the labour supply 
response to SSA to that of SU.
11 The coefficients on spousal unemployment 
(SU) are not significant for women, both on current and previous year’s 
spousal unemployment. Men, however, react negatively to spousal 
unemployment in the previous year in about the same magnitude as SSA.  
 
6.2 Income loss  
 
The literature on the Added Worker Effect suggests that the income loss 
incurred by the household in connection with sickness absence is one reason 
for the spouse to adjust his/her labour supply. Individuals are compensated by 
80% of their income up to a ceiling. However, in addition to the compulsory 
national sickness insurance, most Swedish workers are covered by negotiated 
sickness insurance programs regulated in agreements between the labour union 
and the employer confederations, in general these insurances replace about 10 
% of forgone earnings. Since we do not have the means of knowing which 
insurance is assigned to each individual in the sample and thus do not know the 
exact income loss incurred by the sick spouse, we try to shed light on the 
income effect by running separate regressions on different income level groups 
based on own and spousal earnings level. 
  
6.2.1 Does the effect of SSA vary across spousal income groups? 
 
Table 4 presents the estimations of equation (1) across income groups. We 
divide the sample in three income groups which we refer to as low middle and 
high income groups, based on the spouse’s median income level during the 
period studied. The low income group refers to yearly labour earning of less 
than 170 000 SEK in 1999 year price level, and the high income group refer to 
yearly labour earnings exceeding the ceiling in the sickness benefit system, 
amounting to 7.5 times the Swedish base amount. High income earners are 
bound by the compensation ceiling and bear a relatively larger income loss 
when on sickness absence compared to those who are not bound by the 
compensation ceiling.  
 
In line with the AWE literature, we would expect individuals whose spouses 
are high income earners to increase their labour supply more than those whose 
spouse is not bound by the benefit ceiling.  
 
On the other hand, we do not have any information of the extent of sickness of 
the sick spouse – how much he or she can contribute to household work or is in 
need of nursing assistance at home. Johansson and Palme (1996) find empirical 
evidence of a negative effect on work absence of the direct cost of being 
absent. The income loss of low income earners is relatively low compared to 
that of high income earners given that high income individuals are bounded by 
                                                 
11 Own unemployment is not controlled for here, given that it could be a means of adjusting ones 
labour supply in response to SSA. When controlling for own unemployment the coefficients on 
SU typically drop in magnitude or turn insignificant. the income insurance ceiling. This would suggest that for a given level of ill 
health, high income earners are more inclined to abstain from sickness absence. 
Thus, from a strict loss of income point of view high income earners who are 
on sickness absence may be more likely to be in need of nursing assistance at 
home than low income earners who are on sickness absence. 
 
Table 4: Fixed effects estimation, by spousal income groups Dependent 

























      
         In period t        
< 3 months  -0.020  -0.007 0.000  -0.002 -0.003 0.000 
 (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.011)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.014) 
3-6 months  -0.018  -0.017  -0.071** 0.000  -0.000  -0.031 
 (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.030) 
6-12 months  -0.007  -0.051**  -0.066*  -0.011 -0.018 -0.092* 
 (0.022)  (0.016)  (0.031)  (0.008) (0.012) (0.039) 
        In period t-1        
< 3 months  -0.002  0.001  0.013 -0.019**  -0.013  -0.033 
 (0.023)  (0.013)  (0.025)  (0.007) (0.009) (0.029) 
3-6 months  -0.029  -0.000  -0.089* -0.024**  -0.004  0.039 
 (0.026)  (0.020)  (0.038)  (0.009) (0.014) (0.052) 
6-12 months  -0.003  -0.036  -0.038 -0.009 -0.036*  0.009 
  (0.026) (0.022) (0.046) (0.010) (0.017) (0.055) 




      
In period t  -0.024 -0.072*  0.019  -0.009 -0.043+  0.057 
  (0.021) (0.033) (0.054) (0.008) (0.022) (0.120) 
   In period t-1  -0.009  0.009 0.018 -0.005 -0.016 -0.242 
  (0.023) (0.049) (0.090) (0.010) (0.028) (0.177) 
        
Observations  10076 53815 46634 52745 52866 10984 
#  households  3357  14499 11599 14234 12228 2526 
R-squared 0.11  0.14  0.15 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
Table 4 presents the estimation results by spousal income levels for women and 
men separately. For men, only those whose spouses are high income earners 
react to current year’s SSA, whereas those married to low and middle income 
spouses react to last year’s SSA. 
Women whose spouses are high income earners react to both shorter and 
longer term SSA spells the current year as well as middle term SSA the 
previous year, whereas women whose spouses are middle income earners react 
only to long term SSA the current year. Women married to low income earners 
however do not respond to SSA. The response in the latter category is likely to 
be driven by liquidity constraints as men are typically the main bread winners 
in a household.   
Irrespective of gender, the magnitude of the response to SSA increases with 
spousal income level. Low income households may not have the financial 
security to decrease labour supply in response to spousal sickness spell, 
whereas higher income households potentially have a larger possibility to do so 
or decrease consumption. Moreover, individuals whose spouses are high 
income earners may be more eager to invest in the quick recovery of the ill 
spouse so as to limit the income loss brought about by the sickness absence 
spell. Furthermore, given that high income individuals with incomes exceeding 
the compensation ceiling suffer a larger financial loss from sickness absence 
this could indicate, as discussed above, that they are on average more sick and 
thus in more need of nursing assistance from their spouses – than their lower 
income counterparts. 
 
6.2.2 Does the effect of SSA vary across own income groups? 
 
The results based on own income groups are presented in Table 5. Irrespective 
of gender, middle and high income individuals respond to current long term 
SSA by decreasing their labour supply. The magnitude of the effect is 3.4 % 
and 8% for middle and high income women respectively and 1.9% and 2.7% 
for men. The estimation results in Table 6 also point out that women only 
respond to current year’s SSA, whereas low and high income men respond to 
last year’s SSA as well.  
 
The fact that the labour supply response increases with own income level can 
be attributed to the reasons mentioned above. Low income individuals are 
financially constrained and do not have the possibility to decrease their labour 
supply. Moreover assortative mating leads to low income individuals marrying 
each other, which further strengthens this effect. In fact, when further dividing 
the sample in terms of both own and spousal income level (estimation results 
not presented), we actually find evidence of an increase in labour supply in 
response to SSA for men, in households where both spouses are low income 
earners, in line with the AWE.
12  
 
                                                 
12 The effect is not significant for women. However it is to be noted that the sample size is small 
and the estimates need to be interpreted with caution.   Table 5: Fixed effects estimation for women and men, by own income groups. 
Dependent variable: log earnings 
 Women  Men 















      
      In period t        
< 3 months  -0.007  -0.008  0.001 0.026 -0.006  -0.004 
  (0.010) (0.006) (0.016) (0.023) (0.004) (0.004) 
3-6 months  -0.032+  -0.018+  0.009 0.013 -0.007  0.000 
  (0.016) (0.011) (0.030) (0.037) (0.006) (0.007) 
6-12 months  -0.021  -0.034**  -0.080* 0.047  -0.019* -0.027** 
  (0.022) (0.013) (0.035) (0.045) (0.008) (0.010) 
      In period t-1        
< 3 months  -0.016  0.016  -0.017 -0.077*  -0.010 -0.015+ 
  (0.018) (0.012) (0.033) (0.039) (0.006) (0.007) 
3-6  months  -0.027 -0.016 -0.062 -0.034 -0.008 -0.028** 
  (0.025) (0.017) (0.049) (0.051) (0.009) (0.011) 
6-12  months  -0.019 -0.016 -0.021 -0.044 -0.013 -0.021+ 
  (0.029) (0.017) (0.051) (0.057) (0.010) (0.012) 




      
In period t  -0.033 -0.035*  -0.013 -0.062 -0.010 -0.009 
  (0.028) (0.017) (0.051) (0.053) (0.009) (0.011) 
   In period t-1  -0.001 -0.014 0.003  -0.075 -0.004 0.001 
  (0.033) (0.021) (0.060) (0.067) (0.010) (0.013) 
        
Observations 47928 51856 10878 9591  57967 50696 
#  households 14114 12323 2515  3466  15166 11999 
R-squared 0.13  0.16  0.24 0.07 0.08 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
6.3 What could explain gender differences? 
 
Up to now, our main results are that if individuals respond to SSA, they do so 
by decreasing they labour supply. There is however a difference in gender in 
several respects. Women’s response to SSA is stronger than that of men, and 
they respond more often to current year’s SSA whereas men more often show a 
lag in the response to SSA. We have also found some evidence that women 
react to shorter term SSA as well as longer term SSA spells, whereas men 
mostly react to longer term SSA. 
 
These differences in gender are interesting given that the same labour market 
rules and rights apply to men and women. However men and women differ 
from each other in several respects regarding labour market characteristics. 
Sector affiliation, difference in education level and the traditional unequal 
division of household work going hand in hand with one spouse being the main 
income earners in the family are some aspects which have shown to differ 
across gender.   
6.3.1 Share of household earnings.  
 
Even though Sweden has one of the highest female participation rates in the 
world, men remain for the most part the main income earners in the household. 
We divide the sample in two groups referring to households where the spouse 
contributes more or less than 50 percent of household income respectively so 
as to assess whether share of household earnings lies behind gender differences 
in labour supply response.
13  
 
As shown in column 2 and 4 of Table 6, main income earners in the household 
have the same response to SSA irrespective of gender. They decrease their 
labour supply in response to long term current SSA, as well as last year’s SSA. 
Women have however a stronger response than men, although not always 
significantly stronger.  
 
The similar response to SSA across gender could depend on the fact that the 
sick spouse is not the main income earner meaning that the financial loss 
incurred by the household is relatively smaller – limiting the need to offset this 
income loss by increasing one’s labour supply compared to if the sick spouse 
was the main income earner. Furthermore, if share of household earnings is an 
inverse proxy for time spent on household work, the healthy spouse may need 
to spend relatively more time at home taking care of the tasks usually 





                                                 
13 There are alternative ways of defining these two groups. We choose to divide the 
households based on the spouse’s average share of household income during the period 
studied. This approach could lead to a selection bias, but has the advantage of retaining 
a longer time series dimension within the groups. Alternatively dividing the sample 
based on the share of income in year t-1 would enable a more dynamic specification. 
This would have a few drawbacks though since one would loose a time series 
observation for the households who fluctuate between the two groups. Basing the 
division on one specific year might also give biased results, since that year might not 
be representative due to unemployment, sickness absence etc. The choice of how to 
define the groups doesn’t however qualitatively change the results. 
























Spousal sickness absence      
           In period t      
< 3 months  -0.011 0.000  -0.007 -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) 
3-6 months  -0.029* -0.012  -0.026  0.002 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.031) (0.005) 
6-12 months  -0.040* -0.020+ -0.024  -0.015** 
  (0.017) (0.011) (0.045) (0.006) 
          In period t-1      
< 3 months  0.009 -0.003  -0.052+  -0.013** 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.005) 
3-6 months  -0.008 -0.037*  -0.004 -0.016* 
  (0.020) (0.015) (0.049) (0.007) 
6-12 months  0.000 -0.032*  -0.015  -0.017* 
  (0.025) (0.014) (0.062) (0.007) 
      
Spousal disability pension      
In period t  -0.030 -0.016 -0.024 -0.010 
  (0.029) (0.013) (0.076) (0.007) 
   In period t-1  0.005 0.002 0.018 -0.005 
  (0.037) (0.015) (0.095) (0.008) 
      
Observations  91964 19348 18597 99857 
# households  23886 5239  5243  24638 
R-squared  0.14 0.18 0.05 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
Labour supply response to SSA differs across gender, however, if the sick 
spouse is the main income earner in the household. Men do not react to their 
spouse’s sickness absence whereas women react to middle and long term SSA 
spells the current year, as shown in column 1 and 3 of Table 6. The income loss 
incurred by the household is relatively larger when the sick spouse is the main 
income earner. Despite this, women still decrease their labour supply in 
response to SSA, whereas men do not respond to SSA. The result for men is 
partly in line with the expected outcome, i.e. that since the sick spouse is the 
main income earner, one would expect the Added Worker Effect would kick in, 
or at least partly offset any negative effect.  
 
The fact that women decrease their labour supply could mean that they are 
more dedicated to home production and care-giving compared to men. (After 
all, the magnitude of women’s response to SSA is stronger than that of men.) 
However decreasing ones labour supply to attend to the needs of the sick 
spouse can also be a way of contributing to a faster recovery of the sick spouse. 
In a sense it is then reasonable that women react faster – to current years SSA - 
if the spouse is the main income earner, so as to limit the length of the sickness 
spell.  
 6.3.2 Children.  
 
Given that children entail more household work, one would expect the labour 
supply response to SSA to differ between households with and without 
children. On the one hand, if the spouse is on sickness absence and is not able 
to help out with household work one would expect the unaffected spouse to 
spend more time at home taking care of household work, and expect the effect 
to be stronger if there are children living at home. Households with children 
may, on the other hand, be more financially constrained and not able to 
decrease labour supply in the event of a negative health chock in the 
household. Furthermore, if the sick spouse is the one who initially has the main 
responsibility for household work (which is generally the case for women) one 
would expect the healthy spouse to decrease his labour supply by more than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
 
As shown in Table 7, the overall results suggest that labour supply response to 
SSA is larger among households without children. Among women, there is a 
negative response in labour supply to SSA only in households without children, 
whereas households with children do not react to SSA. Among men there is no 
reaction to current year’s SSA in either type of households, and a slightly 
stronger decrease in labour supply in reaction to last year’s SSA in households 
without children.  
 
The fact that households with children either do not react to SSA or decrease 
their labour supply by less than households without children, suggests that 
households with children are likely to be financially constrained given that they 
can not decrease consumption as easily as households without children. This 
could also explain the finding that households with children do not decrease 
their labour supply in response to current year’s SSA irrespective of whether 
we look at men or women’s behaviour.  
 
If women are the main care-takers in the household and to a larger extent than 
men work part time, men need to increase the time they spend at home – so as 
to take care of the children if their spouse turns ill – whereas women do not 
need to increase time spent at home as much if their spouse turns sick. This 
may explain the fact that men decrease their labour supply in response to SSA, 
whereas women do not alter their labour supply. 
 Table 7: Fixed effects estimation, by type of household. Dependent variable: 
log earnings 
 Women  Men 














absence        
         In period t        
< 3 months  -0.011+ 0.004  -0.004  -0.004 0.002  -0.002 
  (0.006) (0.023) (0.008) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
3-6 months  -0.021* -0.053  -0.024+ -0.002  0.024  0.001 
  (0.010) (0.045) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) 
6-12 months  -0.051** 0.075  -0.014  -0.018+ -0.007  -0.008 
  (0.012) (0.058) (0.017) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) 
        In period t-1        
< 3 months  0.005 0.034 -0.003  -0.011 -0.048**  -0.021** 
  (0.011) (0.043) (0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.007) 
3-6 months  -0.009 -0.045 -0.023 -0.024* 0.016  -0.004 
  (0.015) (0.076) (0.022) (0.011) (0.028) (0.011) 
6-12 months  -0.010 0.002  -0.019 -0.026* -0.032  -0.005 
  (0.016) (0.074) (0.023) (0.013) (0.031) (0.012) 
        
Spousal 
disability 
pension        
In period t  -0.022 -0.063 -0.025 0.001 -0.045  -0.016 
  (0.014) (0.108) (0.026) (0.010) (0.044) (0.012) 
   In period t-1  -0.007 -0.031 0.010  -0.005 -0.054 -0.009 
  (0.018) (0.122) (0.030) (0.012) (0.048) (0.014) 
Observations  36860 23731 74452 40335 25289 78119 
# households  11181 9629  20979 11823 9941  21358 
R-squared  0.08 0.25 0.16 0.03 0.12 0.11 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
6.3.3 Sector of employment.  
 
Since the sector of employment typically differs across gender it is of interest 
to look at the various sector of employment separately so as to see to what an 
extent the differences in response across gender can be attributed to sector 
affiliation. Men are to a large extent employed within the private sector, 
whereas women are typically employed in the municipal or private sector. (See 
Table 2, descriptive statistics) 
As presented in Table 8 both men and women employed in the municipality 
sector react to middle and longer term SSA. Private sector employees do not 
respond to current year’s SSA but react to last year’s SSA, irrespective of 
gender. Women employed in the government sector respond to last year’s SSA 
whereas men in this sector do not respond.  
The overall results are fairly similar across gender within sector of 
employment, which suggests that the sector of employment explains part of the 
gender differences in labour supply response to SSA. It is however not clear 
what the driving force behind these different labour supply responses is. One 
could argue that there is a selection bias in the sectors of employment, where 
people who have chosen occupations within the care sector, also choose to 
spend more time at home caring for a sick spouse. 
 6.3.4 Education level.  
 
Looking at various education groups separately enables us to investigate 
whether the difference in SSA response across gender is driven by differences 
in education levels. Even though men and women on average have a similar 




The results in Table 9 suggest that high educated individuals is the only group 
whose response to current year’s SSA is significant at the 5% level. The 
magnitude of the effect remains stronger among women. High educated men 
and women respond to current year’s long term SSA by decreasing labour 
supply by 3% and 7% respectively. Regarding the response to last year’s SSA, 
it is high educated women as well as middle and high educated men who 
decrease their labour supply.  
 
The difference in labour supply response to SSA across education groups is 
partly in line with our previous results that high income individuals respond 
more strongly to SSA, which is to be expected as higher education is often 
correlated with higher income. Especially for women, however, education level 
seems to play a clearer role compared to income level in determining the 
response to SSA. Recall that middle and high income earning women 
responded to SSA, whereas only high educated women respond to SSA. This 
could be explained by the fact that women tend to work part-time or that 
women’s lower earnings can be partly attributed to the fact that they are more 
likely to be over-educated and thus underpaid compared to men who are more 
likely to be under-educated for the employment they have.
15   
 
 
The initial results suggested that, even though both men and women decrease 
their labour supply in response to SSA, certain differences arise across gender. 
The fact that women react stronger than men does not seem to be attributed to 
any of the above studied characteristics, which typically differ across gender, 
suggesting that women are more care-giving than men and more prone to 
decrease their market activity so as to provide care for a sick spouse. However, 
the findings that women typically react to current year’s SSA whereas men 
react mostly to the previous year’s SSA, and that women react to shorter and 
longer term SSA, whereas men respond to longer term SSA can partly be 
attributed to sector affiliation, education level and to whether or not the sick 













                                                 
14 See Table 2, descriptive statistics as well as Välfärdsbokslutet SOU 2001:53 p150 
15  See Johansson & Katz (2006) and Oscarsson & Grannas (2001)  
 
Table 8: Fixed effects estimation, by employment sector. Dependent variable: 
log earnings 
 Women  Men 
  Priv Gov Muni  Priv Gov Muni 
Spousal 
sickness 
absence        
         In period t        
< 3 months  -0.005 -0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
  (0.010) (0.018) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) 
3-6 months  -0.018 -0.049 -0.027*  -0.000 -0.004 -0.014 
  (0.018) (0.032) (0.013) (0.007) (0.013) (0.011) 
6-12 months  -0.022 0.007  -0.041**  -0.007 -0.033+  -0.040** 
  (0.022) (0.044) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) 
        In period t-1        
< 3 months  0.004 -0.013  0.014 -0.007 -0.025+  -0.046** 
  (0.019) (0.035) (0.014) (0.007) (0.013) (0.012) 
3-6 months  -0.060* -0.131* 0.001  -0.022* -0.030  0.000 
  (0.027) (0.058) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) (0.017) 
6-12 months  0.001 -0.034  -0.039+  -0.032** -0.006  -0.019 
  (0.030) (0.057) (0.022) (0.011) (0.022) (0.019) 
        
Spousal 
disability 
pension        
In period t  -0.011 -0.065 -0.019 -0.016 -0.008 -0.011 
  (0.030) (0.049) (0.021) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) 
   In period t-1  -0.026 -0.081 0.011  -0.003 -0.038+  -0.048* 
  (0.036) (0.058) (0.026) (0.012) (0.020) (0.020) 
        
Observations  48655 12019 50464 79334 17544 21209 
# households  21676 5658  17593 25899 8330  10779 
R-squared  0.13 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.07 0.14 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 










 Table 9: Fixed effects estimation, by education levels. Dependent variable: log 
earnings 














absence        
         In period t        
< 3 months  -0.006 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.001  -0.003 
  (0.011) (0.007) (0.010) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) 
3-6 months  -0.017 -0.021+  -0.032+ 0.020+  -0.008  -0.002 
  (0.019) (0.012) (0.018) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
6-12 months  0.002 -0.023  -0.070**  -0.022+ -0.001  -0.031* 
  (0.025) (0.015) (0.022) (0.012) (0.010) (0.013) 
        In period t-1        
< 3 months  0.017 0.008 -0.008  -0.003 -0.017*  -0.028** 
  (0.021) (0.013) (0.020) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) 
3-6 months  -0.003 -0.031+  -0.009 -0.002 -0.041**  0.009 
  (0.032) (0.018) (0.029) (0.015) (0.011) (0.014) 
6-12 months  -0.002 0.003  -0.072*  -0.022 -0.024*  -0.005 
  (0.034) (0.020) (0.029) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016) 
        
Spousal disability 
pension        
In period t  -0.063* -0.012  -0.035  -0.006 -0.010 -0.015 
  (0.030) (0.020) (0.031) (0.013) (0.011) (0.016) 
   In period t-1  -0.036 0.008  -0.011 0.013 -0.013  -0.011 
  (0.039) (0.024) (0.038) (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) 
        
Observations  13134 54857 43080 22176 55331 40584 
# households  3588  14348 11017 5650  14138 9880 
R-squared  0.10 0.12 0.18 0.06 0.07 0.10 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
6.4 Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this study we have focused on spousal sickness absence exceeding 28 days. 
Although this lower level constraint is due to limitations in the data we argue 
that shorter term sickness absence can be viewed as transitory with a limited 
impact on earnings loss and is less likely to affect longer run implications on 
the labour supply behaviour of the healthy spouse. However to the extent that 
the sickness absence spell is unexpected, the first days of the spell is likely to 
result in a decrease in the labour supply for the healthy spouse who needs to 
take care of additional household work, especially in the presence of young 
children. Including the first days of sickness absence should thus further 
strengthen the negative effects we find, unless the initial decrease in labour 
supply is later compensated by an increase in labour supply, in which case the 
overall effect would be unaffected. For the period 1999-2002 including SSA of 
exceeding 14 days (instead of 28 days) has shown not to alter the results 
qualitatively. The effects on SSA of less than 3 months remain significant and 
of the same magnitude as earlier. 
 We chose to include individuals whose spouses where on disability pension, 
since a majority of those on sickness absence exceeding one year have 
transferred to disability pension schemes. The coefficient estimate of spousal 
disability pension has shown to be negative when significant. Excluding the 
individuals whose spouses are on disability pension, has shown not to have any 
effect on the parameter estimates of SSA. 
 
We have limited the sample to individuals and their spouses who have a yearly 
labour income of 30 000 SEK. The parameter estimates on SSA are typically 
not affected if these low income individuals are included, the main difference is 
that the R-square is significantly reduced. Including these low income 
individuals entails having a larger share of individuals on disability pension. 
The only difference here is that the effect of spousal disability pension appears 
significant more often, though still negative and of a smaller magnitude than 
SSA effects.  
 
We also chose to include individuals who have unemployment spells during 
this period. It could be argued that part of the variation in earnings that these 
individuals incur could depend on transition from or to unemployment. 
However, excluding these individuals has not affected the results.  
 
6.4.1 Contracted hours 
 
In order to investigate whether our results hold for alternative measures of 
labour supply we estimate equation (1) using log of contracted hours as the 
dependent variable. The main differences compared to using yearly earnings as 
a proxy for labour supply is that contracted hours is not representative for the 
whole population since private sector employees, especially small firm 
employees are under-represented. Furthermore the information on contracted 
hours is based on survey information based on a month of measurement and is 
not necessarily representative for the whole year. (see footnote 3 ) Moreover, 
the individual’s own sickness absence considerations do not affect contracted 
hours as an individual who is employed full time, is still considered to be a full 
time employee even if he/she is on full time sickness absence.  
 
Our measure on contracted hours is available for employed individuals, and as 
previously mentioned, a large majority are full time employed, especially in the 
case of men. To account for the bunching of observations at 100, we estimate 
equation (1) as Tobits. Since Tobit estimations cannot be estimated using fixed 
effects we estimate using random effects, and include a set of time invariant 
individual specific variables. These additional variables are education level (the 
highest level of education achieved by the individual during this period) and 
sector of employment (government, private or municipality). Including county 
of residence does not affect the results. 
 
The estimation results from contracted hours are presented in Table 10. Given 
that the coefficient estimates for current year SSA change when including 
previous year’s SSA we present both estimation results with and without 







Table 10: Tobit random effects estimation. Dependent variable: contracted 
hours, in % share of full time 
 Women  Men 
Spousal sickness absence      
           In period t      
< 3 months  0.010 0.002 -0.024  0.009 
  (0.021) (0.009) (0.028) (0.044) 
3-6 months  -0.070* -0.029+ -0.025 -0.066 
  (0.028) (0.016) (0.046) (0.073) 
6-12 months  -0.049 0.025  -0.120*  -0.036 
  (0.032) (0.021) (0.056) (0.095) 
          In period t-1      
< 3 months   -0.008   -0.078 
   (0.018)   (0.075) 
3-6 months   -0.036   0.093 
   (0.024)   (0.116) 
6-12 months   -0.040   -0.053 
    (0.027)   (0.118) 
      
Spousal disability pension      
In period t  -0.055+  0.014  -0.097*  -0.016 
  (0.029) (0.026) (0.049) (0.106) 
   In period t-1   0.005   -0.038 
   (0.031)   (0.110) 
      
Observations  19447 86177  80017  76410 
# households  5403 26020  23416  25045 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
 
 
In line with earlier results based on annual earnings, we see that the overall 
negative labour supply response of SSA based on annual earnings can be found 
on estimation using contracted hours as well. This finding is interesting given 
that contracted hours have a limited variation over time and naturally do not 
include unexpected temporary over-time work, and are pre-set as opposed to 
actual working hours. 
When only looking at current year’s SSA, in column 1 and 3 in Table 10 we 
wee that men react stronger than women to SSA, by decreasing their labour 
supply by 12% in response to long term SSA, whereas women decrease their 
labour supply by 7% in response to middle term current SSA. The same holds 
for disability pension, where men decrease their labour supply by 9.7% 
whereas women decrease their labour supply by 5.5%, although the latter is 
significant only at the 10% level. The fact that men react stronger than women 
is to be expected in a sense, given that men are to a larger extent full time 
employed and have a larger scope of decreasing their labour supply compared 
to women.  
 
When including previous year’s SSA, as seen in column 2 and 3, the effect of 
SSA on men’s labour supply disappears, whereas at the 10 percent significance 
level there is still evidence that women decrease their contracted hours, by 2.9 
percent, in response to current year’s middle term SSA. The fact that the 
significance of the effects disappears when including previous years SSA is however surprising. Contracted hours are likely to be set prior to any new 
(current) information of spousal ill health and could be expected to vary based 
on information on the preceding year rather than the current year. 
7 Concluding discussion  
 
The evidence in this paper indicates that both men and women decrease both 
their yearly earnings and their contracted hours in response to spousal sickness 
absence, suggesting that individuals actually decrease their labour supply.  
 
In an international comparison this robust negative result is not surprising. Any 
positive AWE would be expected to be mitigated by the presence of the 
generous sick leave compensation scheme which provides a state-contingent 
income stream. This might be the main reason why we get strong negative 
results compared to the studies in the US context.
16 The magnitude of the 
response increases with the earnings level of the individual and that of the 
spouse. This indicates that the income loss per se following sickness absence is 
not the driving factor behind how the individual responds to SSA. The fact that 
the response to spousal sickness absence is stronger than that of spousal 
unemployment further points out that other mechanisms than the Added 
Worker Effect are at work.  
 
It is likely that the prevalence of sickness per se in the family is a determining 
factor in the choice to decrease labour supply so as to take care of the sick 
spouse. The finding that high income earners and those with high income 
earning spouses decrease their labour supply more in response to SSA than 
lower income groups supports the assumption that the extent of the income loss 
suffered by going on sick leave could be an indication of the gravity of the 
illness. Similarly, the length of sickness absence may also be an indication of 
the gravity of the illness, as our findings indicate that longer term spousal 
sickness absence usually leads to stronger labour supply responses. Individuals 
whose spouses are on disability pension - a continuation of long term sickness 
absence –seldom show a significant decrease in labour supply. This suggests 
that labour supply responses to sickness absence take place in earlier stages of 
the illness and not when the sickness absence has become permanent.  
 
In the setting of a generous compensation framework, and depending on the 
extent of invalidity of the sick spouse, a decrease in labour supply on behalf of 
the healthy spouse could also be interpreted as being a joint decision of 
synchronizing time out of work and not just a means of spending more time 
with the sick spouse in order to give the sick spouse the needed extra 
assistance. However, to the extent that own sickness absence can be a means of 
adjusting ones labour supply, we have limited the labour supply decreases 
which can be attributed to joint leisure by disregarding sick spells which started 
during the sick spell of the spouse. When including these spells the decrease in 
labour supply in response to SSA is much stronger. 
 
Even though the results indicate that both men and women decrease their 
labour supply in response to SSA, a certain difference emerges across gender. 
(i) Women react stronger than men, suggesting that women a more care-giving 
                                                 
16 Similarly the different results compared to the US, could be due to the fact that Sweden has a 
lower proportion of low income earners. than men and more prone to decrease their market activity so as to provide care 
for a sick spouse. Time out of work that the healthy spouse spends taking care 
of the sick spouse could also be regarded as an investment in the recovery 
process, contributing to a shortening of the sickness absence spell. (ii) They 
react more to current year’s SSA whereas men react to last previous year’s 
SSA. Assuming that individuals decrease their labour supply so as to contribute 
more to home production and take care of their sick spouse our results suggest 
that women decrease their labour supply while their spouse is on sickness 
absence, whereas men adjust their labour supply behaviour after the sick spell 
has ended. (iii) Women react to shorter term SSA whereas men react to longer 
term or previous year’s SSA. These two later findings can partly be attributed 
to sector affiliation, education level and to whether or not the sick spouse is the 
main income earner in the household. 
 
Our results suggest that the institutional context, with the generous sickness 
compensation schemes, seems to play a role in the response to SSA. The 
generous sickness absence compensation scheme enables the individual on 
sickness absence to get more assistance from the spouse, than would probably 
otherwise have been the case. Given that the income loss faced by a household 
in case of sickness absence is limited this enables the healthy spouse to 
decrease his/her labour supply in response to spousal ill health, resulting in a 
reduction of both spouses’ market activity, and a double earnings loss for 
families. From a macroeconomic point of view this comes at a cost of a 
decrease in labour supply on behalf of part of the labour market which is not 
personally affected by the sickness. This poses the question of whether we are 
looking for a family solution. From the standpoint of society, this implies that a 
larger share of the insurance cost is held by fewer. However, if being cared for 
by the spouse is an investment in a faster recovery, a the decrease in labour 
supply in response to SSA might still be beneficial to society. 
 
Getting more detailed information on the actual income loss incurred by the 
sick spouse by using information on collective agreements that each individual 
is entitled to, as well as retrieving information from shorter sickness absence 
spells of less than 14 days, could further enlighten how the sickness 
compensation level affects the individual’s decision to respond to SSA. 
Furthermore, more information on the type of illness and rehabilitation process 
the sick spouses are facing would help limit the existing variation in actual 
disability level and need of nursing assistance which we now have across 
individuals on sickness absence in our sample. Thus further research needs to 
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Table A1: Fixed effects estimation for equation 1 (entire estimation). 
Dependent variable: log earnings 
 Women  Men 
   Std.err    Std.err 
Age  0.044** (0.001) 0.030** (0.000) 
# children under 18  -0.034** (0.003)  0.010**  (0.002) 
# children under 6  -0.134** (0.003)  -0.031** (0.002) 
Migration_dummy  0.001 (0.006)  -0.000  (0.005) 
Dyear97  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Dyear98  -0.006* (0.002) 0.006** (0.002) 
Dyear99  0.029+ (0.015) 0.024** (0.008) 
Dyear00  0.006 (0.019)  0.027**  (0.009) 
Dyear01  -0.002 (0.003)  0.016**  (0.002) 
Dyear02  0.000 (0.000)  0.000 (0.000) 
Spousal sickness absence      
           In period t      
< 3 months  -0.008 (0.005)  -0.002 (0.003) 
3-6 months  -0.024** (0.009)  -0.001  (0.005) 
6-12 months  -0.035** (0.011)  -0.017*  (0.007) 
          In period t-1      
< 3 months  0.004 (0.010)  -0.017**  (0.005) 
3-6 months  -0.022 (0.014)  -0.017*  (0.008) 
6-12 months  -0.021 (0.015)  -0.018*  (0.008) 
Spousal disability pension      
          In period t  -0.032* (0.015) -0.014+ (0.008) 
          In period t-1  -0.007 (0.019)  -0.007 (0.009) 
Spousal unemployment           
          In period t         
< 3 months  -0.010 (0.007)  -0.000 (0.005) 
3-6 months  0.004 (0.011)  -0.007  (0.008) 
6-12 months  -0.017 (0.015)  -0.011 (0.011) 
          In period t-1         
< 3 months  -0.005 (0.007)  -0.010*  (0.004) 
3-6 months  0.000 (0.010)  -0.021**  (0.006) 
6-12 months  -0.014 (0.012)  0.007  (0.008) 
      
Constant  10.250** (0.028)  11.129** (0.023) 
Observations  111312 29125  118454  
# households  29125   29881  
R-squared  0.14   0.08  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses;+ significant at 10 percent;* significant at 5 percent; 
**significant at 1 percent. 
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